

C/S-H-4/782

MEMORANDUM

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 23, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

DOS, OSD
Reviews
CompletedBreakfast Meeting with Schlesinger -
Tuesday, April 24, 8:00 a.m.

There are several issues which you will wish to discuss with Schlesinger:

(1) Military equipment to Egypt -- The important thing to tell Schlesinger here is that the President, in the presence of Fahmy, said to "get with it" on providing equipment to Egypt. You have not discussed this subject directly with Schlesinger before and I think this would be a good time. Schlesinger's reservations will probably be three-fold: possibility of technical compromise, equipment that we have not provided to Israel, and availability. In addition, Schlesinger may point out that it is not possible to provide arms without notifying Congress. I believe he will be easy to get on board on this subject, however, and suggest you give him a pep talk.

(2) In the course of your last telephone conversation with him, Schlesinger noted that he was holding up on delivery of the 200 tanks and 500 APC's. That might not be a bad idea in light of the government uncertainties in Israel, but I wanted to call it to your attention.

(3) SALT -- I suggest that you discuss with Schlesinger the two major options on MIRV -- a modest approach which would slow somewhat the rate of Soviet deployment, or a more radical approach which would require throwing in Trident and B-1. (I will have backup material from your SALT book.) Schlesinger will have been briefed on SALT and may want to discuss some of the other aspects, such as the ABM ban. I suggest that you do not encourage Schlesinger to attend the Verification Panel meeting. The meeting will basically be for discussion and clarification of options, and I doubt that his presence would help.

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Attached to U.S. memo re meeting, 23 Apr 1974

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(4) You have not met with Schlesinger since you returned from Moscow. You may want to fill him in a bit on where we stand with the Soviet Union and also bring him up to date on your talks with the Syrian emissary, Boumedienne, Gromyko, and Fahmy. I am sure he would appreciate also a rundown on your expectations for your trip.

Schlesinger, for his part, may raise the following:

(1) He probably will summarize his trip to Germany.

(2) He met with Goodpaster, who just returned from Bilderburg. Goodpaster told him that Sonnenfeldt had said at the conference that the British should find their salvation by going with the Nine rather than with the U.S. I have not as yet gotten a clarification of this from Hal, but Goodpaster says that it was of considerable interest at the conference.

(3) He may suggest that you talk with the NATO political authorities to get more backing for the NATO improvements which the Defense Ministers want to implement but which they cannot get through their political leadership (such as conditions for mobilization).

(4) He may express his concern over the fact that Harry Bergold (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe in ISA) who is an FSO-3, was not selected for promotion by the Board which just met. (It does on the surface appear to be another case of State's perennial inclination to neglect those serving outside the system.)

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